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Analysis1
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Ori Sharon∗∗
Abstract
U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to
creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually
unlimited enforcement rights. This Article argues that these rights
and immunities result from a form of path dependence, a sequence
of industry-lobbied legislative steps, each incremental and in turn
serving as apparent justification for the next step, without a
rigorous and systematic vetting of the consequences. Because the
resulting “safe harbor” has not been fully vetted, its significance
and utility should not be taken for granted; thus, regulators,
legislators, and other policymakers—whether in the United States
or abroad—should not automatically assume, based on its
existence, that the safe harbor necessarily reflects the most
appropriate treatment of derivatives transactions under
bankruptcy and insolvency law or the treatment most likely to
minimize systemic risk.
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I. Introduction
Bankruptcy law in the United States, which serves as an
important precedent for the treatment of derivatives under
insolvency law worldwide,2 provides unique protections to
2. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the
international financial trade association which represents financial institutions
from forty-seven countries on six continents in the privately negotiated, or overthe-counter (OTC), derivatives industry, often looks to U.S. derivatives
legislation and bankruptcy exemptions as the basis for proposed foreign
derivatives legislation and exemptions. See, e.g., David Mengle, The Importance
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creditors in derivatives transactions. Unlike other creditors of a
debtor,3 derivatives counterparties have special rights and
immunities in the bankruptcy process, including virtually
unlimited enforcement rights against the debtor (hereinafter, the
“safe harbor”). This Article shows that these rights and
immunities accreted over time, primarily due to industry
lobbying and without a systematic and rigorous vetting of the
consequences.
This type of legislative accretion process is not uncommon. It
is a form of path dependence—a process in which the outcome is
shaped by its historical path. Because the resulting legislation—
in our case, the safe harbor—is not fully vetted, its significance
and utility should not be taken for granted.
This Article first provides background on U.S. bankruptcy
law and derivatives transactions.4 Thereafter, it explains the
concept of path dependence, including legal path dependence.5
The Article then reviews the evolution of the safe harbor for
derivatives6 and shows why that evolution has been largely path

of Close-Out Netting, ISDA RES. NOTES, no. 1, 2010, at 4–5 (using the U.S.
bankruptcy law safe-harbor exemption for close-out netting to “illustrate[] the
types of safe harbor provisions that are necessary to make netting enforceable”);
William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson & George G.
Kaufman, Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications
12 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2004-02) (observing that the
“widespread adoption of carve-outs, providing pro-creditor protection for
payment systems and derivative instruments, particularly in the form of
collateral arrangements and netting agreements, represents one of the few
successes in international legal harmonization. This process has been
shepherded by [ISDA]”). Cf. Letter from Katherine Darras, General Counsel,
Americas, ISDA, to Susan E. Voss, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and
James R. Mumford, Chair, Receivership and Insolvency (E) Task Force, Nat’l
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (June 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (observing that “over thirty-seven countries have enacted legislation
that expressly recognizes close-out netting for derivatives transactions” and
suggesting some correlation between that foreign legislation and U.S.
bankruptcy law recognition of close-out netting).
3. A debtor is any person or entity that is the subject of a bankruptcy case.
11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
4. See infra Part II (setting forth the relevant backgrounds of each).
5. See infra Part III (introducing the varied and interdisciplinary forms of
path dependence).
6. See infra Part IV (observing and explicating the changes over time of
safe harbor legislation).
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dependent.7 Finally, the Article reviews the scholarship that
substantively engages the merits of the safe harbor.8 That
scholarship suggests there is a serious question whether the
benefits of the safe harbor exceed its costs, and that the safe
harbor may even have unintended harmful consequences.
II. Background
Broadly speaking, bankruptcy law, which in the United
States is governed by the federal Bankruptcy Code,9 favors
derivatives (including repurchase agreements) counterparties in
three main ways.10 Most prominently, it allows derivatives
counterparties to exercise their contractual enforcement remedies
against a debtor or its property—including closing out, netting,
and setting off their derivatives positions and liquidating
collateral in their possession—notwithstanding the automatic
stay of enforcement actions.11 Secondly, bankruptcy law exempts
derivatives counterparties from the so-called “[trustee-]avoiding
powers,” such as preference rules and constructively fraudulent
transfers, regarding any payments and collateral received prior to
the bankruptcy.12 For example, a derivatives counterparty that
receives a preferentially large repayment from an insolvent
debtor shortly before the debtor’s bankruptcy will not have to
return it.13 Lastly, bankruptcy law allows derivatives
7. See infra Part V (arguing that the changes as noted are path
dependent).
8. See infra Part VI (providing a comprehensive overview of the salient
scholarship on the merits of the safe harbor).
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
10. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the
New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and
Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 645–46 (2005) (“The Code
calls off the automatic stay, prohibition on ipso facto clauses, and its preference
and constructive fraudulent conveyance rules.” (citations omitted)); Shmuel
Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1509 (2005) (identifying
the same three changes).
11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 553(b)(1), 555–56, 559–62
(2012) (establishing particular derivative-counterparty-friendly tenets of the
Bankruptcy Code).
12. Id. § 546(g), (j).
13. See id. § 546(g) (“[T]he trustee may not avoid a transfer, made by or to
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counterparties to enforce bankruptcy-termination ipso facto
clauses14 and to net all existing derivatives contracts with the
debtor.15 This effectively exempts derivatives contracts from a
debtor’s ability to terminate unfavorable contracts.16
To fully grasp the significance of these exemptions, we must
first discuss the rationales underlying bankruptcy law’s debtor
protections. The most notable of the Bankruptcy Code’s debtor
protections is the automatic stay, which prevents the debtor’s
creditors from executing their rights against the debtor or its
property.17 The automatic stay thereby not only protects the
debtor but also prevents creditors from taking enforcement
actions “in pursuit of their narrow self-interests.”18 The stay’s
legislative purpose is to allow companies attempting to
restructure their debt under Chapter 11 “a breathing spell and
time to work constructively with [their] creditors.”19
(or for the benefit of) a swap participant or financial participant, under or in
connection with any swap agreement and that is made before commencement of
the case . . . .”).
14. See id. §§ 559–61 (establishing the limited ability of counterparties to
enforce ipso facto clauses).
15. Upon default of a debtor, derivatives counterparties are allowed to
terminate all existing derivatives trading with the debtor and reduce the
contracts to a single “net” claim. This ability effectively eliminates a debtor’s
ability to terminate unfavorable contracts. See infra Part II.D–F (providing
more fully for the legal theories and authorities that allow for netting).
16. Debtors otherwise have this ability. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (“Except as
provided . . . the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”).
17. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6296–97
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors, stopping all collection efforts, all harassment, and
all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
See also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54–55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5840–41.
18. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
583 (1998) (citation omitted).
19. Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative
Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1063 (1994)
(alteration in original) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 174 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6135, 1978 WL 9628).
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The automatic stay is a core element of any attempt to
reorganize under the Code. By shielding the debtor’s assets
and preventing a race that rewards the first creditor to the
courthouse, it avoids dismemberment of a firm with goingconcern value and facilitates a collective proceeding in which
the parties (debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms
under which the firm will continue as a going concern.20

Preference rules are aimed at enabling debtors in bankruptcy
proceedings to revoke transfers that were made in a manner that
prefers certain creditors over others. The governing principle
underlying preference rules is equality of distribution. Preference
rules apply to transactions executed within the ninety days prior
to bankruptcy filing.21
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provides debtors with
the ability to “assume or reject” executory contracts.22 A debtor
may “cherry pick” which executory contracts to assume and which
to terminate.23 The governing principle underlying this
exceptional legal power is one of debtor rehabilitation and is
aimed at assisting the debtor to successfully reorganize.24

20. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the
Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. REG. 91, 95 (2005); see
also Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives to
Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 828–29 (2010)
In other words, the automatic stay restrains creditors not only to
preserve the resources of the debtor firm but also to ensure that
resources are distributed to creditors in an efficient and equitable
fashion. In this way, bankruptcy law avoids the unnecessary costs
that a grab race would otherwise impose on both the debtor and
slower creditors.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 547; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Grp.,
Inc. (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792, 801 n.14 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The
preference rules in § 547(b) ultimately are concerned with fostering equality of
treatment among creditors of the same class.”).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
23. See id. (establishing that the debtor “may” assume or reject “any
executory contract,” thereby providing the debtor with the discretion to pick and
choose which contracts to assume or reject).
24. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (observing
that “the authority to reject an executory contract is vital to the basic purpose to
a Chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can release the debtor’s estate
from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization”).
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III. The Concept of Path Dependence
A. Defining Path Dependence
Path dependence is a term describing sequential processes
that evolve gradually in “a direction that is [determined and]
influenced by previous [stages] in the process”:25
In broad terms, “path dependence” means that an outcome or
decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the
historical path leading to it. It entails, in other words, a causal
relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, with each
stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage.
At the most basic level, therefore, path dependence implies
that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later
point in time.26

For example, an 18th century fur trader, intent on avoiding
wolves and other dangers, may cut a winding path through the
woods.27 Later travelers follow this path, and in time it becomes a
road.28 As generations pass, the road becomes paved, and houses
and industry are erected alongside.29 Although the dangers that
affected the fur trader are long gone, few question the road’s
inefficiently winding route.30 And any who do question it could be
stymied by the now immense cost of straightening the road,
which (among other things) would require moving housing and
industry; resources invested in the original road and its
surroundings may well render the paving of a straight new road
too costly.31 Path dependence is not restricted to road
25. Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Role of Path
Dependence in the Development of US Bankruptcy Law, 1880–1938, 3 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 203, 206 (2007).
26. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603–04
(2001) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1996) [hereinafter Roe, Chaos] (providing the
example originally).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 643.
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development, but is widespread.32 A “range of technological,
economic, social, and political arrangements, once in place,” can
generate patterns of costs and benefits such that rational
actors prefer to maintain the status quo even if an alternative
might provide higher aggregate returns in the long run. Actors
support the status quo not because change stands to generate
some costs––which is true of almost all changes––but because
change imposes significant net costs at least in the short term.
The longer actors operate within such a status quo, the more
any shift to an alternative is unattractive. Initial choices are
thus “locked in.”33

B. Legal Path Dependence
The evolution of legal rules through legislative accretion can
likewise be path dependent if earlier legislated rules affect the
nature of later legislated rules:
[Many scholars] describe changes in law as being “path
dependent” in that, at any moment, law’s position along its
path of change is the result of many prior choices of direction
at forks along the way.34

This can occur, for example, when “changes in organized interest
groups,” “constituent interests,” or “party influence” affect
subsequent legislation.35
In the earlier fur-trader example, path dependence occurred
because the resources invested in the original road and its
surroundings rendered the paving of a straight new road too
costly.36 Legal path dependence occurs when an initial path
effectively blinds lawmakers to alternative paths. This blindness
32. Cf. Gerard Alexander, Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic
Consolidation, 13 J. THEORETICAL POL. 249, 254 (2001) (observing path
dependence in the decision-making of political institutions as well as major
policy initiatives and state structures).
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern
Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing
Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 405, 415 (1997).
35. Hansen & Hansen, supra note 25, at 206–07.
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (referring back to and
introducing the original example).
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can occur, for example, when legislative patterns are locked-in
due to informational and political burdens.
Informational burdens arise when the choice of one legislative
course of action makes future assessments of alternative
courses harder; actors become used to the “normal” state of
affairs and find it hard to change course.37 Political burdens
are created when groups or institutions sympathize with
earlier legislative choices and wield their influence to
maintain and perhaps magnify the patterns created by those
choices.38 And that in turn can further increase the influence
and political power of those groups or institutions, thereby
further locking in and magnifying the patterns: [R]ule-driven
path dependence might arise from interest group politics. . . .
If the initial pattern provides one group of players with
relatively more wealth and power, this group would have a
better chance to have . . . rules that it favors down the road.
Positional advantages inside firms will be translated into
positional advantages in a country’s politics. And this effect
on . . . rules will reinforce the initial patterns . . . .39

Informational and political burdens discourage alternative
views.40 Parties “do not know enough about the other path
and . . . just thinking about change clashes with our path-induced
perception of ‘normal’ mechanisms. The status quo therefore
persists.”41 Professor Mark J. Roe thus argues that the emergence
of the decentralized corporate ownership model in the United
States blinded policymakers to the alternative models in
existence, such as the German and Japanese models of ownership
through powerful financial institutions.42

37. Roe, Chaos, supra note 27, at 652.
38. Id. (“Incumbents usually wield their influence to maintain themselves
and to stifle upstarts and change.”).
39. Lucien Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131 (1999).
40. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problems
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 785–88
(2003) (describing ways in which public choice theory defeats effective change in
agency rule making).
41. Roe, Chaos, supra note 27, at 651.
42. Id. at 647.
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IV. Evolution of the Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives
The special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy
exemplifies legal path dependence. As explained below, it is an
outcome of decades of sustained industry pressure on Congress to
exempt the derivatives market from the reach of the Bankruptcy
Code, with each exemption serving as a historical justification for
subsequent broader exemptions.
A. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code
The initial exemptions—which were included in 1977 in the
bill that became the Bankruptcy Code—were promoted by an
attorney with ties to the derivatives industry, Stuart D. Root.
Root was invited to testify before a U.S. Senate subcommittee43
and suggested that Congress grant commodities brokers
authority to “close out” an insolvent customer’s account in order
to prevent “a potential domino effect.”44 He argued that the
commodities futures market “is a delicate, if not fragile, system
depending for its success on capital adequacy of the many
participants,”45 and unless the Bankruptcy Code addressed this
fragility, “the system will remain unnecessarily exposed.”46
As sole evidence of this fragility, Root cited a court case,
Geldermann and Company, Inc. v. Lane Processing, Inc.47 In that
case, when a commodities-market trader failed to meet margin
calls, the trader’s broker liquidated a short position in the
43. Mr. Root was invited to testify in front of the Senate Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 2 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5788. He was “an attorney practicing law in New
York City as a member of the firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft [who, in
the course of his practice,] had occasion to counsel institutional investors
concerning aspects of the bankruptcy laws.” Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 521 (1977)
(statement of Stuart D. Root, Esq., New York, New York) [hereinafter Root
Testimony], available at https://archive.org/details/bankruptcyreform1978unit.
44. Id. at 524.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975); Root Testimony, supra note 43, at 524
(citing Geldermann).
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trader’s account and sued the trader for the remaining balance
due.48 The trader counterclaimed that the rules of the
Commodities Futures Exchange, which permitted a broker to
liquidate positions of customers that do not meet margin calls,
were unconscionable and hence unenforceable.49 Rejecting the
counterclaim, the court noted that liquidation rules
promoted the interest and protection of the commission
merchants, their customers and the investing public as a
whole. Investors or speculators who have failed to deposit
sufficient maintenance margins may have insufficient
financial resources to withstand substantial losses on the
market and, if so, continued trading on that account is a
financial risk for the commission merchant, and ultimately for
the commodities exchange if the loss suffered by the
commission merchant exceeds its capital account.50

Root did not explain in his testimony before the Senate, however,
why the inability of a commodities broker to freely close out an
insolvent customer’s account—or why a requirement that the
broker seek court permission to close out that account—could
cause the domino effect he warned against.51
Nonetheless, Congress followed Root’s suggestion and
included several narrow exemptions in the Bankruptcy Code. The
Code included, for example, an exemption from the power of a
trustee-in-bankruptcy to avoid, as a preferential transfer, margin
payments made by or to a commodity broker and liquidations of
commodity contracts.52 The Code also included a limited
exemption from the automatic stay for setoff of mutual debts and
claims in connection with “commodity futures contracts, forward
commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants,
rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or
48. Geldermann, 527 F.2d at 574.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 577.
51. See Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbor, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 319, 329–30 (2010) [hereinafter Repeal] (claiming that this question has
still not been answered by the derivatives industry).
52. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 764(c), 92 Stat. 2549, 2619 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 764(a), (b) (2012)) (“[T]he trustee may not avoid a
transfer that is a margin payment to or deposit with a commodity broker or
forward contract merchant or is a settlement payment made by a clearing
organization and that occurs before the commencement of the case . . . .”).
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securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or
securities.”53 This exemption was “limited” because the legislative
history indicated an intention that the debtor may request the
bankruptcy court, on a case-by-case basis, to hold a hearing on
whether a particular setoff might harm the bankruptcy—in
which case it would be stayed.54 Congress was initially unwilling,
in other words, to provide derivatives counterparties with a
blanket exemption from the automatic stay.55 As will be shown,
these exemptions were later used as precedent to justify broader
exemptions, which in turn served as precedent for increasingly
broader exemptions.56

53. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 362(b)(6), 92 Stat. 2549, 2571 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (2012)).
54. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 51 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5837; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 342 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6298.
55. As will be discussed, see infra Part IV.B, subsequent amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code included language that changed this limited exemption to
a more blanket exemption. See, e.g., Whyte v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 12-civ5318(JSR), 2013 WL 2489925, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) (“Both the facial
breadth of these provisions, and the corresponding legislative history, make
plain that Congress intended to place swap transactions totally beyond the
inherently destabilizing effects of a bankruptcy and its attendant litigation.”
(emphasis added)).
56. Indeed, “[t]he special treatment of derivative contracts is just one more
example of the increasing tendency for special interest legislation to erode the
efficiency of [C]hapter 11 by piecemeal repeal of the chapter.” Stephen J.
Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 63–64 (2009) [hereinafter Derivatives and Bankruptcy].
This gradual process, by which financial instruments proliferate and grow over
time in the shadow of certain legal arrangements, without systematic
examination of consequences, is not unique to the Bankruptcy Code or the
derivatives market. Others have identified similar occurrences that weakened
the financial system and contributed to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. See, e g.,
JENNIFER S. TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE
REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS
222–46 (2014) (accusing various participants in the law- and rule-making
processes of being “legal enablers of the toxic chain” that led to the economic
crisis); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 661 (2012) (“The
incremental nature of this process is critical to understanding how these
transactions became so complex and why that complexity was not subject to
greater regulatory or market scrutiny prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis.”).
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B. The 1982 Amendment
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, starting in 1982,
further expanded the safe harbor exemptions. The potential
“domino” (sometimes called “ripple”) effect argument—
essentially, concern about systemic risk—was repeatedly raised
as a justification for introducing these exemptions.57
The 1982 amendment expanded the safe harbor beyond
commodities futures markets. The amendment added narrow
exemptions from the automatic stay for “mutual debt and claim”
setoff by securities counterparties and liquidation of derivatives
contracts.58 The new “contractual right to liquidate” also accorded
certain counterparties this power to terminate and liquidate
derivatives contracts upon insolvency of the debtor, thereby
circumscribing the Bankruptcy Code’s ban on ipso facto clauses.59
The 1982 expansion of the safe harbor was viewed by
Congress as merely continuing the goal of preventing systemic
risk.60 But that risk, which was described in 1978 as a “potential
domino effect,”61 was now termed a threat of market collapse.62
Also, the 1982 legislative history does not reference the 1978
legislative intention that part of the safe harbor would be
construed only as a shift of legal burden, with its actual
application being developed by judicial analysis.63 The 1982
57. Stephen Adams discusses the centrality of systemic risk to the safe
harbor justifications historically and notes both the unanimity and vagueness of
the discussions. Stephen D. Adams, Derivative Exemptions in Bankruptcy and
Dodd Frank: A Structural Analysis 9–13 (Harvard Law School, Financial Crisis
Working Papers Series, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2348828.
58. Pub. L. No. 97-222, 96 Stat. 235, 236 (1982) (amending § 362(b)(6) of—
and adding §§ 555–56 to—the Bankruptcy Code).
59. Jonathon Keath Hance, Derivatives in Bankruptcy: Lifesaving
Knowledge for the Small Firm, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 711, 739–40 (2008).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583,
583.
61. Root Testimony, supra note 43, at 524.
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
583, 583 (deeming the potential risk to “threat[en] the collapse of the affected
market”).
63. See Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy, supra note 56, at 63–64
(describing the 1978 legislative intention that courts should determine, on a
case-by-case basis, whether a particular action which may be harming the estate
should be stayed).
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amendment thus signified a significant next step in a gradual
process toward the complete severance of the derivatives market
from debtor protections in bankruptcy. As we next discuss, this
perception shift—from what previously was seen as merely a
potential risk, to a real systemic threat—accompanied all
subsequent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor.
C. The 1984 Amendment
In 1984 Congress added repurchase agreements to the
classes of derivatives exempted from the Bankruptcy Code’s
automatic stay.64 The amendment also broadened the range of
parties entitled to the exemptions beyond derivatives-market
actors. Thus, the safe harbor exemption was granted to a “repo
participant,” i.e., any party to a repurchase agreement.65 On the
other hand, the amendment imposed a time limit in the definition
of “repo participant,” providing the safe harbor only to “an entity
that, on any day during the period beginning 90 days before the
date of the filing of the petition, has an outstanding repurchase
agreement with the debtor.”66
A repurchase agreement was narrowly defined as well, and
the amendment restricted the exemptions to agreements for the
transfer of certificates of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, or U.S.
government securities.67 In contrast to the 1982 restrictive
definition of “contractual right to liquidate,” the 1984 amendment
introduced a flexible meaning to the term, referring not only to a
rule or bylaw of an exchange, a securities association, or a
clearing agency but also to “a right, whether or not evidenced in
writing, arising under common law, under law merchant or by
reason of normal business practice.”68 In addition, the
authorization
to
liquidate
a
repurchase
agreement

64. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 391, 98 Stat. 333 (amending § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code).
65. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 391, 98 Stat. 333, 365 (redefining definitional
terms to a broader extent and amending § 101(36) of the Bankruptcy Code).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 559, 98 Stat. 333, 366.
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notwithstanding the automatic stay included permission to
foreclose on the underlying collateral.69
This authority to go against the underlying collateral
exceeded previous contractual rights to liquidate commodities
and forward transactions that involved the writing of an
offsetting position.70 It paved the way for subsequent
amendments that allowed derivatives counterparties a broad
right of foreclosure on security interests, notwithstanding
bankruptcy of the debtor (which had granted the security
interest). The 1984 amendment thus can be seen as continuing a
shift in Congress’s approach towards the derivatives market.
While the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the 1982 amendment were
relatively restrained in exempting derivatives counterparties
from the Code’s protections, the 1984 amendment moved toward
a broader exemption of derivatives in bankruptcy.71
D. The 1990 Amendment
With the ongoing development of financial markets and new
financial instruments, the derivatives industry became concerned
that the existing safe harbor would be insufficient.72 In 1988,
Senators DeConcini and Grassley introduced a bill to amend the
Bankruptcy Code regarding swap agreements.73 The bill was
endorsed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), which urged Congress to eliminate the risk that market
liquidity would be restricted due to application of the Bankruptcy

69. Id.
70. The “contractual right to liquidate” derivatives contracts previously
granted to derivatives counterparties “was limited to the right to close out an
open position.” Hance, supra note 59, at 742 (referring to Pub. L. No. 97-222,
§ 556, 96 Stat. 235, 237, which stated that the “contractual right to liquidate”
does “not constitute the right to transfer cash, securities, or property held with
respect to such contracts”). Due to the nature of repurchase agreements
(essentially collateralized loans), this restriction was not included in the 1984
amendment.
71. See id. (“[J]ust two years after the 1982 Amendments, Congress
widened the scope of the automatic stay exemptions . . . .”).
72. Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at 647 nn.40 & 43 (alluding to
worries among industry groups, practitioners, and members).
73. See generally S. 2279, 100th Cong. (1988).
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Code to swap transactions, “particularly in periods of volatility.”74
In a classic example of interest-group politics intervening to lock
in path-dependent legislative patterns, ISDA noted that
“Congress has for many years recognized the need for certainty
and speed in the treatment of securities and other similar
financial transactions in bankruptcy,” and that former
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code with regard to securities,
commodities, and repurchase agreements “worked well in
practice and have provided needed certainty.”75 ISDA argued that
the requested new protections “closely parallel[ed]” those
provided by the 1982 and 1984 amendments.76
The proposed amendment deviated, however, from the
former amendments at least in one aspect: it explicitly exempted
netting. Derivatives are traded between parties according to rules
established in a master agreement. The master agreement serves
as a contractual framework for multiple transactions, providing
“the general terms of the agreement between counterparties with
respect to general questions such as credit support arrangements,
netting, collateral, definition of default and other termination
events, calculation of damages (on default), documentation, and
so forth.”77 ISDA’s standard master agreement provided that all
swap transactions between parties are terminated and netted in
the event of a default.78 Without an explicit exemption in the
Bankruptcy Code, the derivatives industry feared that the
practice of netting would be prevented by the automatic stay. The
1990 amendment provided this exemption. A “swap agreement”
was expansively defined, encompassing any conceivable form of a
swap transaction, any option to enter a swap transaction, any

74. Bill Pertaining to Title 11 of the United States Code, The Bankruptcy
Code: Hearings on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1863, and S. 2279 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Administrative Practice of S. Comm. on Judiciary, 100th Cong.
672 (1988) (statement of the International Swap Dealers Association in Support
of S. 2279) [hereinafter Statement of ISDA].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk:
Netting, Collateral, and Closeout, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 55, 58 (2006).
78. Netting allows “any potential liability of a defaulting party [to be]
reduced by the value of any swap transaction that favored that party.”
Statement of ISDA, supra note 74, at 674.
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combination of the foregoing, and even a master agreement “for
any of the foregoing together with all supplements.”79
The 1990 amendment nonetheless continued, as in former
amendments, a somewhat transaction-specific expansion of the
safe harbor. This transaction-specific approach fostered an
intricate patchwork of rules, which led to market confusion.80 The
exemptions sometimes lacked coherence, with rights available to
counterparties differing from one financial product to another
without clear economic rationale.81
E. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005
By the time a further expansion to the safe harbor was
considered in 2005, the 1998 near failure of the Long-Term
Capital Management hedge fund (LTCM) provided a dramatic
example of the possible association between derivatives and
systemic risk.82 LTCM started its operations in early 1994.83 Its
portfolio increased rapidly, and by the end of 1997, LTCM was
already “significantly larger than any other reporting hedge fund
family at that time.”84 By August 1998, after only four years of
operation, LTCM’s gross notional amounts of derivatives
contracts exceeded $1.4 trillion.85 LTCM’s rapid growth in trading
was contrasted with a gradual thinning of its capital and assets

79. Pub. L. No. 101-311, § 101, 104 Stat. 267.
80. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at 646–47 (“None of these
transactions was defined by the Code; a judge was presumably expected to rely
on standard market definitions.”).
81. See id. at 647–48 (“As a result, a pension fund or oil company might
find itself protected with respect to swaps but unprotected with respect to
forwards with the very same party.”).
82. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 77, at 66 n.30 (noting “concerns that
failure of LTCM would likely have resulted in severe market disruptions and
significant losses to direct counterparties and other market participants”).
83. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
10 (1999),
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf
[hereinafter PWG REPORT].
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 11–12.
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base, resulting in a leverage ratio of more than 25:1 on the eve of
the events that caused its near collapse.86
An unexpected series of market movements during August of
1998—due to devaluation of the Russian Ruble—caused LTCM to
suffer equity losses of over 50%.87 LTCM found it harder and
harder to raise capital as its condition deteriorated.88 By midSeptember 1998, the possibility of LTCM’s collapse became a
reality, and markets were frantic about its implications.89
In an effort to prevent a financial disaster, the New York
Federal Reserve organized a creditors’ bailout of LTCM.90
Grouping together fourteen of the most concerned LTCM
counterparties, the N.Y. Federal Reserve orchestrated an
out-of-court recapitalization scheme under which the firms would
inject $3.6 billion in new equity into LTCM in return for 90% of
the ownership interest in the firm.91 The recapitalization scheme
was accepted by LTCM, and the crisis was resolved with LTCM
primary counterparties assuming responsibility for allowing “the
hedge fund to build up its positions in the first place.”92
In April 1999, the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets (the PWG) issued a report on the LTCM crisis (the PWG
Report). Among other things, the PWG Report observed that if
LTCM had defaulted, the use of close-out netting rights by
derivatives counterparties that are not subject to the automatic
stay would have mitigated counterparty losses and reduced the
likelihood of instability in the financial markets.93 Therefore, it
argued, “[t]he ability to terminate most financial market
contracts upon an event of default is central to the effective
management
of
market
risk
by
financial
market
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 12–13 (noting that LTCM’s previously flexible credit
arrangements became more rigid, which exacerbated LTCM’s liquidity problem).
89. See Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCA, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 699 (2005) (noting that, given LTCM’s size, its collapse
could have widespread effects on the market).
90. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 20, at 100 (claiming that LTCM
would have collapsed without the Federal Reserve’s intervention).
91. PWG REPORT, supra note 83, at 13–14.
92. Id. at 14.
93. See id. at 19 (arguing that these rights limit the potential size of credit
exposures, thus promoting market stability).
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participants . . . .”94 Terminating derivatives transactions alone is
not enough; termination “goes hand in hand with netting,”95
which serves as a “domino effect” constrainer because it reduces
the exposure of counterparties to a failed debtor.96 Based on these
findings, the PWG urged Congress to further expand the
Bankruptcy Code safe harbor to improve market stability.97
The PWG’s call for a broadening of the safe harbor was not
left unheard. The recommendations of PWG were incorporated
into an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999,98 ultimately enacted as the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCA).99 BAPCA gave free rein to derivatives
counterparties to completely circumscribe the Bankruptcy Code’s
94. Id.
95. Id. at 20.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 26 (arguing that such expansion would prevent a single
insolvency from triggering multiple insolvencies throughout the market).
98. See Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 18 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Leach) (“Title X contains legislative proposals forwarded to
Congress by the nation’s financial regulators in order to guard against systemic
risk to the nation’s financial system . . . . The specific proposals are derived from
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.”); Bankruptcy Revision:
Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 31 (1999) (statement of Rep. Roukema)
This Title will harmonize banking and bankruptcy law with respect
to the netting of financial contracts. It was produced by the
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets and is strongly
supported by the Federal Banking agencies. I support Chairman
Leach on this and appreciate that the Committee has included this
Title in the Bankruptcy Bill.
Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
& Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 347 (1999) (statement
of Oliver Ireland, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Sys.)
Title X includes a number of proposed amendments to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act and the Bankruptcy Code, as well as other
statutes relating to financial transactions. Most of these provisions
incorporate or are based on amendments to these statutes that were
endorsed by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.
The Board supports enactment of the provisions recommended by the
President's Working Group. Enactment of these provisions would
reduce uncertainty in the financial markets.
99. Pub. L. No. 109-008, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1502 (2005)).
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automatic stay and preference rules. First, it expanded the Code’s
definitions of “securities contract,”100 “commodities contract,”101
“forward contract,”102 “repurchase agreement,”103 and “swap
agreement”104 to include a long list of specific types of known
derivatives, as well as any other similar agreement or
transaction,105 any combination of the defined derivative
transaction,106 any option to enter a derivative transaction of the
kind defined in the specific clause,107 a master agreement that
provides for the defined derivative transaction, or any security
agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement related
to the defined transaction.108 The purpose was to enable the safe
harbor to encompass any future version of existing derivative
transaction and “to avoid the need for future amendments.”109
BAPCA also expanded the safe harbor by creating a new
category of parties eligible for safe harbor protection.110 In order
to make certain that closeout and netting would be available to
derivatives counterparties even if they did not fit neatly into one
of the specific definitions available in the Code, BAPCA created a
general definition of “Financial Participant” to include any entity
that, at the time it enters a securities contract, commodity
contract, swap agreement, repurchase agreement, or forward
contract, or at the time of the filing of its bankruptcy petition,
holds a total of $1 billion in notional or actual principal amount of
derivatives transactions, or gross mark-to-market positions of not
less than $100,000,000 (aggregated across counterparties), in one
or more agreements with the debtor on any day during the prior

100. Id. § 901(b) (amending the definitional provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 101).
101. Id. § 901(c) (same).
102. Id. § 901(d) (same).
103. Id. § 901(e) (same).
104. Id. § 901(f) (same).
105. Id. §§ 907, 101(25), 101(53B), 741(7), 761(4). For some reason, repos did
not enjoy this specific expansion.
106. Id. §§ 907, 101(25), 101(47), 101(53B), 741(7), 761(4).
107. Id. § 901(f)(1)(vi).
108. Id. § 901(f)(1).
109. Campbell, supra note 89, at 704.
110. See Hance, supra note 59, at 757–58 (noting that Congress created a
“catchall category” for “financial participants”).
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fifteen month period.111 The intention was to include very large
institutions whose collapse would pose imminent threat to the
sustainability of the market.112
BAPCA also introduced the concept of cross-product netting
into the Bankruptcy Code.113 Adding the terms “master netting
agreement” and “master netting agreement participant” to the
list of contractual relationships and parties exempted from the
automatic stay,114 it enabled derivatives counterparties to
document a wide variety of derivatives transactions and to
execute netting between different products traded with the
debtor.115
These expansions to the safe harbor—which as always, were
justified as a means to reduce systemic risk116—were not
unopposed. The National Bankruptcy Conference, which includes
some of the nation’s leading bankruptcy scholars and
practitioners, advised Congress’s Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law that “[t]here is no indication that the
absence of such cross-product netting features has led to
widespread difficulties or systemic disruptions in the financial
markets for such products.”117 Professor Randal Picker of the
111. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A))
(defining the new category criteria for “financial participants”).
112. See Hance, supra note 59, at 758 (noting that the new category came
from a concern for “the possibility of systemic risk if large financial participants”
faced challenges in filing).
113. See Morrison & Riegal, supra note 10, at 649 (noting that “the Act
creates a new super-category” to include cross-product netting). In practice,
cross-product netting was not new to the industry. However, prior to BAPCA, it
was not clear whether this practice is permitted by law. BAPCA solved this
uncertainty by providing a legislative right to cross-product netting in
bankruptcy. Id. at 647, 649.
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(38A), (38B), 362(b)(27) (2012) (defining both terms
and providing for an exemption from the automatic stay for the “exercise . . . of
any contractual right” under a security agreement associated with a master
netting agreement).
115. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 130–31 (2005) (describing the purpose
and function of the new category for “financial participants”).
116. See id. at 130 (noting the inclusion of the new category to limit the
potential impact of insolvencies upon other market participants).
117. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 179 (statement of Randal Picker, on behalf of the
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National Bankruptcy Conference also warned Congress, although
to no avail, that “master netting could deprive a debtor of muchneeded cash collateral, which in some instances may lead to
conversion and liquidation to the detriment of other creditors
[and therefore that] the master netting provisions should be
deleted.”118
F. The Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006
Notwithstanding the expectation that BAPCA’s expansion of
the safe harbor would be sufficient,119 Congress once again
amended the Bankruptcy Code in 2006.120 This is its most recent
effort to “update the [safe harbor] language to reflect current
market and regulatory practices, and help reduce systemic risk in
the financial markets by clarifying the treatment of certain
financial products in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency.”121
The 2006 amendment focused, among other things, on
improving “the netting process for financial contracts . . . by
strengthening and clarifying the enforceability of early
termination and close-out netting provisions.”122 The belief was
that stronger netting capacity can help to enhance market
stability; counterparties of a distressed debtor will have less
incentive to terminate their positions because they can net and
thereby reduce their exposure to the debtor’s credit risk.123 Little
thought appears to have been given to whether stronger netting
might backfire by motivating increased counterparty
concentration, thereby increasing systemic risk.124

National Bankruptcy Conference).
118. Id. at 177.
119. See Campbell, supra note 89, at 74 (discussing the hope that the
BAPCA of 2005 would not need further amendments).
120. Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-390, 120
Stat. 2692 (2006).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 109-648, pt. 1, at 1–2 (2006).
122. Id. at 2.
123. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 77, at 62 (discussing the market
effects of netting).
124. See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (observing that stronger
netting can motivate increased counterparty concentration).
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V. Is the Derivatives Safe Harbor Path Dependent?
The foregoing discussion shows that the derivatives safe
harbor is at least largely path dependent. Recall that legal path
dependence occurs when an initial path blinds lawmakers to
alternative paths.125 This blindness can occur when legislative
patterns are locked-in due to informational and political burdens,
which discourage alternative views.126
The origin of the path dependence was the lobbyist-sponsored
limited exemption, included in the bill that became the
Bankruptcy Code, for the allegedly fragile commodities futures
market.127 The untested justification for the initial exemption—
concern about systemic risk—was reiterated for subsequent
expansions of the safe harbor, often without questioning, much
less careful investigation, of the merits of the expansions to
protect against systemic risk.128 Thus, rights that were initially
provided to specific counterparties were later granted to any
counterparty.129 Exemptions from certain procedures given to one
counterparty were later given to another, with no questioning of
the need for or the consequences of such actions.130 As the
legislative history demonstrates, Congress usually assumed that
an expanding safe harbor would help protect against systemic
risk, and with each passing amendment, that assumption became
125. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (discussing path
dependence generally).
126. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text (discussing the patterns
of legal path dependence).
127. See James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29
THEORY & SOC’Y 507, 513 (2000) (observing that “once a particular option is
selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point
when multiple alternatives were still available”); supra notes 43–52 and
accompanying text (describing how Mr. Root’s testimony altered Congress’s
legislative trajectory).
128. See PWG REPORT, supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text
(discussing the effect of lobbying on the development of legislation). The PWG
Report constituted the most important study of the merits of the safe harbor.
That Report, however, has been criticized. See infra notes 186–92 and
accompanying text (arguing that unrestricted close-out netting, the Report’s
central recommendation, can trigger the equivalent of a bank run).
129. See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing the
expansion of rights through amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
130. See id. (discussing the Congressional response to the PWG report).
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more entrenched as a truth.131 This reflects an informational
blindness, discouraging alternative views.132 Building on this
informational blindness, the derivatives industry succeeded to
completely exempt itself from the restrictions of the Bankruptcy
Code.133
The informational blindness was almost certainly
exacerbated by both the complexity of derivatives and
uncertainty over how systemic risk is created and transmitted.134
Conceptualizing alternative paths is always difficult, and the
more complex and uncertain the alternatives the more difficult it
is.135 From its inception, the discussion in Congress of the safe
harbor was overshadowed by these complexities and
uncertainties, as well as imprecision about the causal
relationship between derivatives and systemic risk.136 Being
concerned about the latter, members of Congress tended to see
what they expected to see,137 the expectation in this case being
131. See, e.g., Statement of ISDA, supra note 74, at 674 (observing that
“Congress has for many years recognized” the need for the safe harbor).
132. See supra Part III.B (discussing legal path dependence).
133. See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text (discussing the almost
complete exemptions from bankruptcy offered by the safe harbor provisions for
derivatives parties).
134. See Roe, Chaos, supra note 27, at 651 (observing that one cause of the
information burden is that decision-makers do not know enough about
alternative paths).
135. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 34, at 452
Society is also faced with the unpredictable ripple effects the law’s
failure will have on the proper functioning of many other laws and,
consequently, the other social institutions with which the laws are
intertwined. Structural complexity breeds vulnerability, which breeds
more structural complexity, which breeds more vulnerability, and so
on.
136. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at 641 (observing that Congress
was so intimidated by the complexity of the derivatives market that it directed
professional bankruptcy judges to apply a formalistic inquiry that is detached
from the transaction’s characteristics and is wholly dependent on industry
custom); infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text (observing the difficulty of
obtaining accurate information about the relationship between derivatives and
systemic risk); Adams, supra note 57 (noting in regard to the initial enactment
of the safe harbor in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code that “[t]he newness and
complexity of derivative instruments were obstacles to full understanding of
what they were capable of and how they should be used”).
137. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom-To-Failure Cycle,
62 DUKE L.J. 767, 767 (2012) (observing that, being “limited-capacity
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driven by powerful derivatives-industry lobbying pressure.138
From a public choice standpoint, no powerful interest groups
presented Congress with opposing views.139
The safe harbor expansion, accomplished through
incremental amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, was
accompanied in part by liberal judicial interpretation of the safe
harbor’s reach. That liberality also appears to be explained by the
informational burden.140 Courts could not independently
investigate, and thus had little choice but to accept, the merits of
the systemic risk justification for the safe harbor reflected in the
legislative history.141
For example, in the In re National Gas Distributors, L.L.C.
case,142 a trustee-in-bankruptcy alleged that gas supply contracts
entered into by the debtor with customers during the year
preceding its bankruptcy petition created fraudulent conveyances
and therefore should be avoided.143 The customers countered that
the contracts were “commodity forward agreements” within the
Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “swap agreements,” and thus
were exempt from avoidance.144 Looking to the legislative history,
the court noted that in enacting the safe harbor, “Congress
intended to protect the financial markets” from “the destabilizing
effects of bankruptcy.”145 Accordingly, the court remanded, noting
that the “bankruptcy court gave the definition of ‘commodity

information processors,” human beings “tend to compensate [in areas of
complexity] by relying heavily on . . . simplifications of reality that allow us to
make decisions in spite of our limited ability to process information” (internal
citations omitted)).
138. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing ISDA’s rise
in prominence and power). The most dominant derivatives-industry lobbying
organization was ISDA.
139. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (observing that the
leading organization that presented Congress with opposing views was the
National Bankruptcy Conference, which consisted of bankruptcy scholars and
practitioners).
140. See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text (noting that the Courts
relied on the same information bases as Congress in making decisions).
141. See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
142. 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009).
143. See id. at 249–50 (discussing the factual background).
144. Id. at 250.
145. Id.

1740

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014)

forward agreement’ a more narrow reading than the statute
bears.”146
The 2005 expansion of the safe harbor accomplished in
BAPCA, which exempted all derivatives transactions (broadly
defined) from bankruptcy law, in part reflects a corollary form of
a path-dependent informational burden. The pre-BAPCA
Bankruptcy Code contained inconsistent definitions of exempted
derivatives transactions and parties—an outcome of the gradual
path-dependent progression of the exemptions based on the
constant emergence of new derivatives and market practices.147
That in turn caused additional uncertainty as to which
derivatives counterparties and transactions were covered by the
safe harbor.148 That additional uncertainty created an incentive
for Congress to follow ISDA’s recommendation and include all
derivatives counterparties and transactions in the safe harbor.149
To the extent BAPCA’s 2005 expansion of the safe harbor
was recommended by the PWG Report, issued by the President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets,150 such expansion might
not appear to represent legal path dependence. Nonetheless, that
Report does not address opposing views such as those of the
National Bankruptcy Conference.151 Furthermore,
146. Id. at 259. The court further observed that although
these particular contracts were not traded in financial markets—and
perhaps were not even assignable—they nonetheless could have an
influence on markets in which participants enter into hedging
agreements. A business can enter into a forward agreement with a
party who then, in reliance on that forward agreement, enters into
another contract with yet another market participant, who in turn
may enter into even other contracts. And so a simple forward
agreement may readily become tied into the broader markets that
Congress aimed to protect in BAPCPA.
Id. at 257.
147. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at 646 (discussing the limited
exemptions under the “old Code”).
148. See id. at 646–47 (discussing the difficulty of interpreting the new
provisions).
149. See id. at 648–49 (discussing the expanded definitions under the newer
provisions).
150. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (discussing the external
influences on Congress during the adoption of the BAPCA).
151. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns
addressed in the PWG Report).
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ISDA played a significant role in the drafting of the relevant
provisions of . . . [the BAPCA and] worked in “close
collaboration” with the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets . . . . ISDA prepared a position paper in
1996 setting forth the need for amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code . . . and proposing language for many of the provisions
eventually amended by BAPCA. ISDA also participated in
many of the hearings that led up to the eventual adoption of
the provisions that were passed as part of the BAPCA.152

Indeed, ISDA’s significant influence reflects the fact that as the
derivatives industry skyrocketed in size,153 lobbyists such as
ISDA became much more powerful, creating a political burden
that discouraged alternative views.154 This parallels the
observation that the legislative creation of incumbents “cause[s]
changes in the costs and benefits of interest group organization”
and “affect[s] the resources available to an interest group [such as
ISDA] and thus its ability to provide resources to legislators.”155
152. Brief for the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae supporting Appellants at 1–2, In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., L.L.C.,
556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2105), 2008 WL 412344.
153. The size of the derivatives market grew immensely during the three
decades that passed since the initial enactment of the first safe harbor
provisions in 1978. See, e.g., Rene M. Stulz, Financial Derivatives: Lessons from
the Subprime Crisis, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter 2009, at 61 (“Over the
last three decades, outstanding derivatives have increased 300-fold.”);
Waldman, supra note 19, at 1031–32 (“Totaling only $3 billion in notional
principal in 1982, the market for swaps, the most common form of derivative,
has risen over 1200-fold in ten years.”); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Bd., Remarks before the Futures Industry Association: Financial
Derivatives, (Mar. 19, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/board
docs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm (“At year-end [1998], U.S. commercial banks,
the leading players in global derivatives markets, reported outstanding
derivatives contracts with a notional value of $33 trillion, a measure that has
been growing at a compound annual rate of around 20 percent since 1990.”).
154. The ISDA took a leading role in the promotion and drafting of the safe
harbor. See, e.g., Brief for the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae supporting Appellants at 2–3, In re Nat’l Gas Distribs.,
L.L.C., 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2105) 2008 WL 412344 (“ISDA was
specifically thanked by Senator Dennis Deconcini for its role in the 1990
legislation that first created Bankruptcy Code safe harbors for swap
agreements.”). See generally supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Role of Path
Dependence in the Development of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 1880–1883 7 (Am.
Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2005–14, 2005)
[hereinafter Hansen & Hansen Working Paper].
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Ironically, the increase in the size of the derivatives industry was
itself partly fostered by the safe harbor, which encouraged firms
to deviate away from traditional financing into exotic derivatives
to avoid application of bankruptcy law.156 And that, in turn, has
made the financial system even more complex, further reinforcing
the informational blindness.157
The safe harbor has by now become so embedded in the
norms regarding bankruptcy treatment of derivatives that
changes would be costly.158 This also parallels the observation
that the choice of a certain legal path can encourage affected
actors to invest resources in practices that conform to that path,
thereby further locking it in:
[I]nstitutions and structures might have already developed to
address needs and problems arising under these rules . . . .
Various players-managers, owners, lawyers, accountants, and
so forth-might have invested in human capital and modes of
operation that fit the existing . . . rules. Replacing these rules
would require these players to make new investments and to
adapt to the new rules, [thereby] reinforc[ing] [the] existing
rules . . . .159

VI. Reassessing the Derivatives Safe Harbor
Path-dependent legislation is not necessarily bad.
Nonetheless, if such legislation is not fully vetted, its significance
and utility should not be taken for granted. In this Part, we
review the existing scholarship that substantively engages the
merits of the safe harbor. Although we have not made an
independent analysis of the merits of the safe harbor, our review
indicates that some scholars seriously question whether its
benefits exceed its costs.
156. See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 559 (2011) [hereinafter
Derivatives Market’s Payment] (discussing the relationship between derivatives
and the Bankruptcy Code).
157. See supra notes 131–39 and accompanying text (discussing
informational blindness).
158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (observing that resources
invested in an original road and its surroundings may well render the paving of
a straight new road too costly).
159. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 39, at 156.
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A. Does Market Concentration Justify the Safe Harbor?
The characteristics of the derivatives market have
contributed to the belief that a collapse of a derivatives
counterparty might precipitate a systemic meltdown.160 The trade
in derivatives is concentrated among relatively few major
firms.161 It therefore is feared that the collapse of a single firm,
especially a highly connected one, might systemically disrupt the
derivatives market, which could then impact the financial system
more broadly:
Much OTC [over-the-counter] derivatives activity in the
United States is concentrated among 15 major U.S. dealers
that are extensively linked to one another, end-users, and the
exchange-traded markets. This combination of global
involvement, concentration, and linkages means that the
sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal from trading of any of
these large dealers could cause liquidity problems in the
markets and could also pose risks to the others, including
federally insured banks and the financial system as a whole.162

160. See Waldman, supra note 19, at 1055 (“Following substantial market
losses, there is the risk that the failure of one significant participant to make
payments could result in . . . a rapid, global transmission of defaults . . . . This
risk is heightened by the fact that much of the derivatives business is
concentrated in a small number of banks.” (emphasis added)). See also DAVID
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 135 (2011) (“The argument that serious
counterparty risk was at stake was based on the concentration of the derivatives
industry, with the major players—known before the crisis as the Fourteen
Families—heavily connected with one another. If one fell, some have argued, the
others could fall.”).
161. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (2011) (“Among U.S. bank
holding companies, of the notional amount of OTC derivatives, millions of
contracts, were traded by . . . many of the same firms that would find
themselves in trouble during the financial crisis. The country’s five largest
investment banks were also among the world’s largest OTC derivatives
dealers.”).
162. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 7 (1994). See also Edwards &
Morrison, supra note 20, at 98 (observing that “[f]ear that a counterparty
insolvency could trigger a systemic meltdown in the ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC)
derivatives market stems partly from the fact that this huge market is
dominated by a few large international banks and securities firms”). Based on a
2009 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency study, Professor Roe reports that
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This systemic risk story, however, is far from proved. There
is “little actual evidence to support” the story.163 On the other
hand, based on a 2004 ISDA study, economists Bliss and
Kaufman estimated that the net exposure of the major
derivatives dealers to their five largest dealer counterparties
(adjusting for collateral) averaged only 1.15%.164 If this estimate
is correct—the estimate might be inaccurate in individual cases
because its adjustment for collateral does not take into account
dealers’ increased exposure due to asset fire-sale runs, and the
estimate is somewhat circular insofar as it is based on full netting
which might be facilitated by the safe harbor165—it is highly
unlikely that a collapse of one dealer could directly cause the
failure of another major dealer.166
It is also ironic that the safe harbor itself may have
exacerbated the movement toward market concentration of the
derivatives industry, including by reducing derivatives traders’
incentives to diversify and monitor their counterparties’
profiles.167 For example, the safe harbor enables creditors to
ignore counterparty risk because a creditor can foreclose on the
collateral notwithstanding the counterparty’s bankruptcy.168 This
“[t]he derivatives market is strongly centralized, with five firms accounting for
nearly 90% of the industry’s net credit exposure.” Roe, Derivatives Market’s
Payment, supra note 156, at 561.
163. Lubben, Repeal, supra note 51, at 331. Professor Lubben observes that
“there is little actual evidence to support even th[e] narrow claim” that “the
special interrelations among financial firms, combined with some special
volatility of derivatives, necessitates altering the Bankruptcy Code to prevent a
systemic crisis.” Id.
164. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 77, at 67 (discussing the actual net
exposure).
165. See id. (discussing the effect of the safe harbor). The estimate is not,
however, entirely circular: it does not necessarily assume unrestricted collateral
enforcement, nor does it assume close-out of derivatives positions. See id.
(discussing the “systemic risk argument”).
166. See id. at 68 (discussing the risk among dealers); SKEEL, supra note
160, at 135 (referring to the concentration argument in favor of the safe harbor).
Skeel observes that “we know now that Lehman’s bankruptcy filing did not lead
to the failure of any of the bank’s counterparties . . . . Within a couple of weeks,
the vast majority [of Lehman’s derivatives trades] had been closed out, without
any of the counterparties failing.” Id.
167. See PWG REPORT, supra note 83, at 8 (noting that “counterparties
typically use collateral as a risk mitigation device”).
168. See id. (discussing “collateral practices”).
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means that creditors “are not overly concerned with their debtor’s
financial stability, because they protect themselves with the
debtor’s collateral, rather than with their understanding of the
firm itself.”169 As a result, systemic risk actually may increase:
[I]f the superpriorities had not been in place when Lehman
built its capital structure and derivatives portfolio, Lehman’s
derivatives and repo counterparties’ incentives to insist upon a
more stable Lehman would have been greater. And Lehman
itself would have been incentivized to keep to a safer capital
structure to encourage its counterparties to keep dealing with
it at low cost.170

Lack of information regarding the financial condition and
resiliency of derivatives counterparties can also make market
participants more likely to overreact to new information
regarding liquidity constraints in financial markets.171 Unable to
distinguish “good” firms from “bad,” market participants may
overreact, posing a threat to the entire financial system.172 This
adverse selection was seen in the financial crisis “when there was
a run on the investments banks and money market funds after
Lehman Brothers failed . . . . Like past runs, the runs on
investment banks and money market funds occurred because
there was uncertainty and lack of information about the health of
these institutions . . . .”173
The safe harbor’s close-out netting provisions, which are
exempted from the automatic stay, can also contribute to
increased market concentration. Unrestricted close-out netting
permits derivatives positions to be adjusted by executing an
offsetting position with the same party without incurring
169. Roe, Derivatives Market’s Payment, supra note 156, at 559.
170. Id. at 554.
171. See Judge, supra note 56, at 696 (discussing how the availability of
information affects systemic risks).
172. See id. (discussing “common mode failure” which “arises when the
failure of one financial institution sends signals to the marketplace about the
financial well-being of other institutions with similar exposures. If market
participants were perfectly informed, of course, a failure would not convey any
new information”).
173. Viral V. Acharya et. al, Market Failures and Regulatory Failures:
Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises, in MASAHIRO KAWAI AND ESWAR
PRASAD, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND REFORMS IN EMERGING MARKETS 64
(2011).
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additional costs (in terms of cash flow, collateral, credit risk
management, or even being required to engage the market for an
alternative offsetting position from a weak bargaining stand).174
That in turn allows market participants to concentrate their
positions with relatively few dealers.175 Without unrestricted
close-out netting, “the concentrations we see in the dealer market
which give rise to systemic concerns simply would likely not exist
[because] [t]he capital available to support gross credit risk
exposures would far exceed the capital currently needed to
support net exposures.”176
B. Is the Safe Harbor Focused on the Right Parties?
Professors Edwards and Morrison observe that the fear of
derivatives-induced systemic risk is warranted only in the case of
an insolvency of a major financial market participant holding a
massive derivatives portfolio.177 The safe harbor’s exemptions,
however, operate independently of the size of the counterparty or
its portfolio.178 Furthermore, they apply not only to financial
firms but to any firm that holds a derivative.179 Thus a bank that
makes a secured loan cannot enforce its collateral against a
174. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 77, at 62 (discussing how position
netting permits troubled companies to remain active in the market).
175. See id. at 61 (observing that this creates “incentives to deal with one
counterparty rather than many”).
176. Id. at 67. Although ISDA has expressed concerns regarding the
increase in exposure that could result from limiting the safe harbor, such an
increase would likely be temporary, diminishing as market participants
rearrange their portfolios to adapt to the changed risk. See Mengle, supra note
2, at 6 (discussing the dangers of reducing the safe harbor provisions).
177. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 20, at 98 (discussing the possible
market effects of the failure of a “major financial market participant”).
178. See id. (noting that the Code provides protections to large market
players).
179. See Lubben, Repeal, supra note 51, at 328 (discussing the role of safe
harbors in reducing risk). Lubben observes, for example, that
the argument for the safe harbors is quite simple: the safe harbors
reduce systemic risk by giving large financial institutions special
treatment. This argument only holds, if at all, with regard to
derivative transactions among financial institutions, and thus
supports only a much narrower version of the existing safe harbors.
Id. at 331.
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bankrupt borrower, whereas an ordinary business firm can
enforce its collateral against a bankrupt derivatives
counterparty.180 The safe harbor exemptions may go well beyond
the underlying goal of reducing systemic risk.181
It is unclear if that breadth is needed. Some argue, for
example, that although the systemic risk argument cannot justify
a blanket protection to all market participants, it is impractical to
base laws on the size of the affected party.182 Others acknowledge
that while a “more fine-grained approach that applied the
automatic stay to [only] some derivatives . . . would complicate
the treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy,”183 a “more nuanced
approach is preferable to adopting a blanket rule that invites
strategic termination by non-debtors.”184
C. Possible Unintended Consequences
In its current form, the safe harbor may well have
unintended harmful consequences. In this subpart, we will
discuss the possibility that close-out netting can cause the
equivalent of a “bank run,” and also the likelihood that the safe
180. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of the safe harbor provisions to large market participants).
181. See Hance, supra note 59, at 759–61 (debunking the systemic risk
argument); Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy, supra note 56, at 75
(discussing the end result of “wealth transfer” between market participants);
Vasser, supra note 10, at 1542 (questioning the validity of the systemic risk
argument).
182. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 77, at 68 (discussing the different
effects between large and small business failures).
183. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2007).
184. Id. The safe harbor might itself facilitate systemic risk. For example,
the Financial Stability Oversight Council identified the absence of a bankruptcy
mechanism to facilitate the orderly liquidation of a defaulted dealer’s collateral
as one of “ongoing vulnerabilities” in the repo market. See FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 133, available at http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/annual-report.aspx (discussing the “sources
of vulnerability . . . of great concern to the Council”). This vulnerability created
a systemic risk of market collapse caused by the “fire sale” of a defaulting
dealer’s collateral. Id. As the FSOC observed, the exclusion of derivatives from
bankruptcy’s automatic stay left financial markets in a void with no protection
against abrupt liquidity changes. See id. (discussing the “absence of a
mechanism to facilitate orderly liquidation of a defaulted dealer’s collateral”).
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harbor’s breadth enables virtually any financial contract,
including an ordinary secured loan, to be documented as a
derivatives transaction, thereby exempting the contract from the
automatic stay and other critical bankruptcy provisions.185
Close-out Netting Can Trigger the Equivalent of Bank Runs.
Recall that the PWG Report’s central recommendation was that
close-out netting should be exempted from the Bankruptcy Code’s
automatic stay and other restrictions.186 The Report’s rationale
was that close-out netting would help to mitigate counterparty
losses and thus reduce the likelihood of instability in financial
markets.187 Professors Edwards and Morrison argue to the
185. See generally infra notes 186–215 and accompanying text. We already
have mentioned other potential unintended consequences of the safe harbor:
that stronger netting might backfire by motivating increased counterparty
concentration, thereby increasing systemic risk. See generally supra notes 123–
24, 168–70 and accompanying text. Also, master netting could deprive a debtor
of much-needed cash collateral, which in some instances may lead to conversion
and liquidation to the detriment of other creditors. See generally supra notes
117–18 and accompanying text. The safe harbor might have an additional
unintended consequence. The PWG Report’s favoring of netting provisions,
being focused on damage to the derivatives market as a whole, overlooks the
danger of systemic risk as a result of a specific counterparty collapse. For
example, if netting provisions were subject to the automatic stay, LTCM would
have had to engage a larger number of counterparties in order to reach the same
gross positions. This, in turn, would have meant that each counterparty was less
exposed to an LTCM default because the individual gross positions of each
counterparty with LTCM would have been smaller. Thus, if LTCM had gone
into bankruptcy under a no-safe-harbor regime, the market as a whole would
have suffered the same gross damage, but its sustainability would have been
higher. Market diversity reduces the possibility of any given firm sustaining
larger losses than its loss absorption capability. David Skeel notes that due to
safe harbor privileges,
rather than spreading their derivatives business among a multitude
of counterparties, [derivatives participants] can feel free to load up on
derivatives with [a single counterparty] . . . . By lowering the risks of
having a large exposure to any given counterparty, the special
derivatives rules have thus diminished the incentives for a bank to
spread its derivatives business around . . . . If derivatives and other
financial instruments were subject to the same core principles as
other contracts[,] . . . derivatives creditors would pay much closer
attention to a debtor’s financial condition, and they would be much
more careful to limit their exposure to any particular institution . . . .”
SKEEL, supra note 160, at 161–62; see also Roe, Derivatives Market’s Payment,
supra note 156, at 561–62 (discussing mechanisms in the derivatives market).
186. See generally supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
187. See generally supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
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contrary, however, that unrestricted close-out netting can trigger
the equivalent of a bank run.188
Using LTCM as an example, they contend that unrestricted
close-out netting would have motivated LTCM’s creditors to rush
to net and close out their positions.189 That, in turn, could have
caused or exacerbated “liquidity shortages, resulting in systemic
illiquidity with the potential to cause widespread contagion.”190
They also argue that such a rush “could have resulted in the
immediate and widespread liquidation of assets at fire sale
prices.”191 Absent unrestricted close-out netting, however,
Edwards and Morrison believe that
LTCM’s major creditors almost certainly would have opted to
facilitate a bankruptcy supervised creditor “work-out” by
putting in more capital and reorganizing the ownership
structure of LTCM, just as they did under the Federal Reserve
arranged work-out. Indeed, as subsequent events showed, it
was clearly in the collective interest of LTCM’s counterparties
and creditors to avoid a “run” on LTCM and the accompanying
firesale of its assets. Thus, in the absence of the Bankruptcy
Code’s special treatment of derivatives, Fed intervention may
have been unnecessary.192

188. See Edwards & Morrision, supra note 20, at 101 (discussing the LTCM
example and the possibility of “widespread liquidation of assets at fire sale
prices”).
189. See id. at 101 (discussing the possible effects of close-out netting in the
LTCM example).
190. Id.
191. Id. Other scholars suggest that these systemic illiquidity and
liquidation concerns could be muted, however, by steps such as allowing
regulators a limited period of time (e.g., 24 hours) to transfer derivatives of a
failed counterparty to third parties. See VIRAL V. ACHARYA, THOMAS F. COOLEY,
MATTHEW RICHARDSON & INGO WALTER, REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODDFRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 27–28 (2011)
(discussing remedies for system illiquidity). But cf. Mengle, supra note 2, at 6
(cautioning that delays longer than twenty-four hours “might unnecessarily
expose market participants to market risks”). Some of these suggestions were
incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Act’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, but
Stephen Adams has argued that the passage of the OLA may increase the need
to address the bankruptcy safe harbor both by undermining its primary
justification and by the threat of interference with the OLA’s effectiveness. See
Adams, supra note 57, at 24–27 (discussing the role of the safe harbor provisions
in relation to the OLA).
192. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 20, at 103.
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We do not purport in this discussion to independently
critique the merits of unrestricted close-out netting. Our point is
simply that it has been the subject of serious criticism by
respected scholars.193 ISDA’s Head of Research has responded to
such criticism but only in generalities, including observing the
international legal harmonization towards allowing unrestricted
close-out netting.194 The fact that something is occurring does not
necessarily mean, however, that it should be occurring195—
especially when lobbying is a cause of what is occurring.196
The Safe Harbor’s Breadth Enables Ordinary Financial
Contracts to be Documented as Derivatives Transactions. Because
derivatives transactions are exempted from bankruptcy law,
another unintended consequence is that parties are tempted to
try to document ordinary financial transactions as derivatives
193. See Mengle, supra note 2, at 5 (observing that “a handful of academics
and bankruptcy lawyers in the United States [have] suggest[ed] that the [closeout netting] safe harbor[] be abolished altogether”). Mengle notes that the
commentators cite
a variety of justifications: one commentator argues that the ability to
terminate can lead to systemic crisis; others suggest that close-out
netting and other risk mitigation mechanisms reduce incentives to
monitor credit quality; and still others argue that close-out netting
works at cross-purposes to the objectives of bankruptcy by
redistributing risk from derivatives participants to other parties.
Id.
194. See id. at 5 (maintaining that “inability to terminate or net contracts
with an insolvent firm would leave surviving firms vulnerable to losses caused
by sudden market changes”). The argument takes into account ex post but not
ex ante implications, disregarding how increased exposure would motivate
derivatives counterparties to diversify and monitor. See generally supra notes
175–76 and accompanying text. Mengle observes that
more generally, changing the treatment of derivatives and other
financial contracts would represent a major departure by the United
States from the trend toward cross-border convergence of the
treatment of derivatives in insolvency and from the widespread
acknowledgement by policy makers of the contribution of netting to
financial stability.
Mengle, supra note 2, at 5. Cf. Bergman et al., supra note 2, at 2 (observing that
the safe harbor types of exemptions “represent[] one of the few successes in
international legal harmonization”).
195. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10–14 (1971).
196. See Enrico Perotti, Systemic Liquidity Risk and Bankruptcy Exceptions,
DSF POL’Y PAPER SERIES, No. 8, at 4–5 (Oct. 2010) (observing that the safe
harbor provisions were “heavily lobbied by the financial industry”).
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transactions in order to benefit from the exemption.197 During the
deliberations preceding the 1990 amendment to the safe harbor,
Professor Picker even warned Congress that “[t]he expansion of
these provisions would take us farther down the path of allowing
sophisticated parties to opt out of bankruptcy.”198
The safe harbor is now so broad that, it appears, virtually
any ordinary financial transaction can be documented to fall
within it.199 The safe harbor uses broad definitions of derivatives,
no longer requiring that they be traded on financial markets or be
physically settled.200 Although some courts have tried to resist
overly broad categorization of ordinary financial contracts as
derivatives, they have been overruled on appeal due to the
breadth of the safe harbor.201
In In re National Gas Distributors, L.L.C.,202 for example, the
lower court found that ordinary agreements to purchase
commodities should not be treated as derivatives and therefore
should not be exempt from bankruptcy law.203 The court feared a
slippery slope: that exempting ordinary contracts as derivatives
would disrupt
the overall scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. If this agreement
is a [derivative] agreement, then many of the most important
aspects of the Code, including priorities of distributions to
creditors and the automatic stay, will be eviscerated in even
the smallest case of a farmer who contracts to sell his hogs at
the end of the month for a set price. No public purpose would
be served, and the result would be wholly at odds with the
established aims and order of bankruptcy proceedings.204

197. See generally infra note 209 and accompanying text.
198. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III), Hearing on H.R. 833 Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 179 (statement of Randal Picker, on behalf of the
National Bankruptcy Conference).
199. See generally infra note 209 and accompanying text.
200. See generally supra notes 110–27 and accompanying text.
201. See generally infra notes 202–15 and accompanying text.
202. 369 B.R. 884 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007).
203. See id. at 899–900 (concluding that the agreements were not “swap
agreements”).
204. Id. at 900.
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On appeal, however, the court’s decision was reversed, given the
breadth of the safe harbor language.205
Similarly, in In re MBS Management Services,206 a lower
court held that an ordinary electricity supply contracts was a
derivatives contract and thus exempt from bankruptcy law:
“[a]dmittedly, even supply contracts have hedging or risk
management attributes. By setting the price for electrical power,
end users protect themselves against large fluctuations in price
and stabilize their cost of power.”207 The lower court’s reasoning,
which cited with favor the proposition that there is “no reason . . .
to distinguish between [derivatives] contracts, and ‘ordinary
purchase and sale’ forward contracts, when the statutory
language makes no such distinction,” was approved by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.208
Under the current safe harbor language, virtually any
financial contract, including an ordinary secured loan, might be
able to be documented as a derivatives transaction, thereby
exempting it from the automatic stay and other critical
bankruptcy provisions.209 Some textbooks are openly encouraging
parties to design financing contracts as derivatives transactions,
in order to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code’s restrictions.210
205. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text (discussing the
National Gas decision in the Fourth Circuit).
206. 432 B.R. 570 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2010).
207. Id. at 576.
208. See In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 352, 357–58 (5th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the lower court’s reasoning and holding).
209. See Kenneth N. Klee, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, and
Senior Partner, Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff, & Stern LLP, Statement at the
International Insolvency Institute, Seventh Annual Conference: Understanding
Derivatives: Dissecting Complex Financial Instruments (June 12, 2007)
(discussing the broad nature of the current safe harbor provision). Others have
made similar observations. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 89, at 712 (stating
that a “cynic might argue that the financial safe harbor [is] indeed a
‘bankruptcy opt-out clause’ for a certain class of capitalists because their money
is more important than everyone else’s”); Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at
642, 647, 660, 663 (discussing various ways financial market participants can
use the Code provisions to their advantage); Christopher J. Redd, Treatment of
Securities and Derivatives Transactions in Bankruptcy, Part I, 24-6 AM. BANKR.
INST. J 36, 37 (2005) (“The [Code] provisions generally operate to exempt a large
number of routine financial market payments and transfers from the Code’s
automatic stay and avoidance provisions.”).
210. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 20, at 121 (discussing other
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Indeed, one of the authors was recently told, in confidence, by a
prominent financing lawyer that it could be malpractice for
lender’s counsel to draft a secured loan as an ordinary loan and
security agreement, because drafting it as a derivatives contract
would allow the secured lender to foreclose notwithstanding the
automatic stay.211 Professors Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel,
Jr. have observed, in this context, that the costs of completely
excluding derivatives from the protections that bankruptcy law
gives debtors are likely to rise, as firms increasingly turn to
derivatives as a substitute for traditional financial
instruments.212
It thus is clear that the safe harbor is too broad, but if a safe
harbor is needed—a question as to which we are agnostic—it may
be difficult to design a more limited set of exemptions. One
problem is that numerous bankruptcy judges, with varied
backgrounds, preside over cases involving derivatives, so
“predicting the treatment of complicated financial contracts upon
a future bankruptcy filing would be quite difficult.”213 The
resulting uncertainty “might have detrimental (i.e., inefficient)
effects on the larger derivatives markets, which has importance
well beyond the world of bankruptcy.”214 The experience of judges
applying the safe harbor in its earlier (and narrower) years
showed the pitfalls of trying to differentiate exempted and nonexempted transactions.215
VII. Conclusions
In the United States, bankruptcy law grants special rights
and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including
virtually unlimited enforcement rights.216 This Article has argued
commentators advice on how to “use derivatives contracts to reduce the costs of
bankruptcy”).
211. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (establishing the automatic stay provisions).
212. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 183, at 1050 (arguing for a “more
nuanced approach” for derivatives, rather than a “blanket exception”).
213. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy, supra note 56, at 75.
214. Id.
215. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 10, at 645–47 (discussing the
difficulty in defining and applying certain provisions in the previous code).
216. See generally supra Part II.
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that these rights and immunities are largely path dependent,
resulting from a sequence of incremental industry-lobbied
legislative steps, without systematic and rigorous vetting of the
consequences.217
Because the resulting derivatives “safe harbor” has not been
fully vetted, its significance and utility should not be taken for
granted. Regulators, legislators, and other policymakers—
whether in the United States or abroad—should not
automatically assume that the safe harbor necessarily reflects
the most appropriate treatment of derivatives transactions under
bankruptcy and insolvency law, or the treatment most likely to
minimize systemic risk.218
We do not argue that the safe harbor is necessarily bad.
Because we have not made an independent investigation of the
safe harbor’s merits, we are agnostic. A path-dependent result is
neither intrinsically good nor bad.219 For example, the pathdependent U.S. corporate management model, which favors
strong managers over strong owners, is not necessarily better or
worse than the converse; it is just that there has been neither a
fully informed discussion in the United States regarding the
benefits of one model over the other nor an economic “battle”
between the two models.220 Stakeholders, legislators, and
policymakers took for granted and adapted to the model that
evolved, without questioning it.221
Sometimes, however, path-dependent outcomes can have
adverse consequences.222 Our review indicates that some scholars
217. See generally supra Part V.
218. See generally supra Part V.B.
219. See Roe, Chaos, supra note 27, at 647–51 (describing three forms of
path dependence, with only two leading to inefficient outcomes).
220. See id. at 646 (discussing the lack of comparative data or information).
221. See id. (noting the lack of comprehensive research of multiple
perspectives on the issue).
222. See id. at 660 (identifying a regulation that bars bondholders from
voting to approve recapitalization schemes if the scheme includes provisions
that change the maturity date or the principal amount of the bonds). According
to Roe, this regulation is rooted in a 1928 New York Appellate Division decision
that interpreted the then New York Negotiable Instruments Law. See id. at 664
(noting the condition came from the court, not “bond market efficiency, bond
market fairness, or securities laws”). The decision, which held that a bond
allowing a vote to change the maturity date or principal is nonnegotiable, was
turned into a regulation during the Great Depression. See id. at 661 (discussing
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believe that the derivatives safe harbor can be harmful, not only
potentially increasing systemic risk but also possibly
undermining the application of bankruptcy law to financial
contracts generally.223 We therefore suggest that a more fully
informed discussion of the merits of the derivatives safe harbor—
under U.S. bankruptcy law, and under foreign insolvency laws to
the extent such laws incorporate similar derivatives
exemptions—may well be timely.
Finally, our analysis suggests that heightened informational
burdens due to complexity and uncertainty can increase the
influence of interest-group politics.224 That, in turn, can make
legislation more vulnerable to legal path dependency, especially
when—as in the case of the derivatives safe harbor—no powerful
interest groups present opposing views.225 In the face of
increasing financial complexity, further research into the causes
and consequences of legal path dependency may be warranted.

the effects of the decision). Changes in the structure of the bond market
rendered the regulation superfluous and cumbersome, but despite having no
economic rationale, the regulation still exists. See id. at 661–62 (discussing the
path dependency of the regulation). To overcome it, the bond market and the
surrounding legal infrastructure had to adapt to the existing legal frame. See id.
at 662 (noting the “jerry-rigged adaptations [that] allowed it to survive”). The
1978 Bankruptcy Code allowed such votes as part of a “pre-packaged
bankruptcy,” and market pressure led authorities to permit numerous
prohibited recapitalization schemes under an “emergency” financial necessity
label. See id. (discussing how the law’s application created a need for
adaptations). Nevertheless, the specific provision that bars certain
recapitalization schemes was not revoked. See id. (discussing how the law
adapted but was not repealed because of path dependency).
223. See generally supra Part IV.
224. See supra notes 134–37 (observing that the informational blindness was
almost certainly exacerbated by the complexity of derivatives and uncertainty
about systemic risk, and in the face of complexity and uncertainty, people tend
to see what they expect to see with the expectation in this case being driven by
lobbyist pressure).
225. See generally supra notes 131–56 and accompanying text. Legal pathdependency is premised on two change-impeding features: information burdens
and interest-group politics. Path dependency information burdens have two
features: the difficulty to think on alternative paths and customary perception
that impedes change (such as the human tendency to rely on simplifications in
the face of complexity). As we demonstrated, both these features are inherent in
complex systems.

